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Judicial Decision Making In the Supreme
Court of Canada:
Updating the Personal Attribute Model

DONALD R. SONGER University of South Carolina
SUSAN W. JOHNSON University of North Carolina,
Greensboro
Introduction
In 1975, Parliament granted the Supreme Court of Canada almost complete control over its docket in response to the Court’s increasing workload ~Epp, 1996!. Clearly, Parliament understood that granting docket
control to the Supreme Court would be a matter of decreasing the workload rather than extending power to the Court. However, Chief Justice
Laskin felt that the jurisdiction confirmed the court as “Canada’s ultimate appellate court” ~Bushnell, 1992: 405!. Bushnell writes that “for
Laskin, the new jurisdiction was a symbol that the Court had finally
achieved its true nature as a final court of appeal, which for him meant
that it had unquestionably a law-making role” ~405!.
In 1982 another major institutional change in Canada increased the
policy-making opportunities of the Court. The passage of the Charter of
Rights and Freedoms expanded the Court’s power of judicial review and
guaranteed a major role for the Court in constitutional policy making.
Public law cases, especially criminal and constitutional, now clearly predominate over private law disputes on the Supreme Court docket. With
the potential for judicial policy making now firmly established, the political preferences and attitudes of the justices are becoming increasingly
relevant. As Justice Sopinka said in an address at the University of Windsor, following passage of the Charter, “Public trust in the impartiality of
judges should not and cannot be based upon the naive assumption that
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judges upon appointment abandon their former political beliefs and cease
having an interest in political issues” ~quoted in Bushnell, 1992!.
The present study adds to the growing literature on judicial policy
making by exploring the contribution of the political preferences of the
justices of the Supreme Court of Canada to their decision making in controversial cases from 1949 to 2000. In particular, we follow-up the seminal study of Tate and Sittiwong ~1989! to examine the continuing
relevance of the personal attributes of the justices to their decision making and to assess whether the personal attribute model developed by those
scholars has become time bound as the agenda of the court and the nature
of the justices appointed to the Court have changed over the past quarter
century.

Policy Making and the Judicialization of Politics
“The phenomenon of judges making public policies that previously had
been made or ... ought to be made by legislative and executive officials
appears to be on the increase” throughout much of the world ~Tate and
Vallinder, 1995: 2!. Jackson and Tate show that the increasing use of judicial review in various countries has led to dramatic public policy change.
They note that European courts in practice are more likely to use judicial review than US courts ~1992!. Judicial review is also substantial in
Japan, Italy, Canada and most of Western Europe and extends to nations
outside Europe and the industrialized world to the Philippines, and India
~Gadbois, 1987; Holland, 1988; Stone, 1992!. With so much evidence of
the use of judicial review in making substantial public policy, it becomes
increasingly relevant to understand the characteristics of judges that influence their policy choices in judging.
The judicialization of politics that is growing in much of the world
has also been quite evident in Canada, especially in the past two decades.
Baar found that since the adoption of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms in 1982, the Supreme Court justices had been even more activist in
their interpretations of it than was originally expected ~1991!. Critics of
the process refer to the “charter revolution” and note that “a long tradition of parliamentary supremacy has been replaced by a regime of constitutional supremacy verging on judicial supremacy” ~Morton and Knopff,
2000: 13!. And even skeptics who question whether there has been a major
transfer of power to the courts still believe that the courts may have a
long-term impact on policy by the manner in which they shape the way
the public thinks about political values ~Russell, 1995!.
If judges and courts around the world are activist in interpreting their
nations’ laws and in shaping public policy, then it becomes important to
ask whether the personal ideology or policy preferences of the judges

Abstract. This study seeks to add to the current understanding of the political nature of the
Supreme Court of Canada. We analyze a data set consisting of all nonunanimous published
Supreme Court decisions for the period 1949 to 2000. A prior study by Tate and Sittiwong
~1989! suggested a model of judge attributes for the period 1949 to 1985. We build on that
analysis by extending the time period to 2000, which allows the impact of gender also to be
assessed. We find that since the Court gained substantial docket control, the types of cases the
Court hears has changed from the period studied by Tate and Sittiwong. In the more recent
period, civil rights and liberties cases are much more substantial in number. We conclude some
of the variables in the Tate and Sittiwong study may be time bound and we suggest a new
model of attitudinal voting.
Résumé. Cet étude cherche de augmenter le savoir courant du le nature politique du Cour
suprême du Canada. Nous analysons un ensemble de données non unanime compose de tout
décisions publié du Cour suprême entre les années 1949 à 1985. Une enquête précède fait par
Tate et Sittiwong ~1989! a proposé un modèle des attributs des juges pour la période entre 1949
à 1985. Nous poursuivons laquelle analyse pour prolonger la période du temps jusqu’à 2000, ce
que on permettre évalue l’effet du sexe aussi. Nous trouvons que comme le Cour a conquis
considérable control du registre, les gendres dossier entendre par le Cour ont changé depuis le
période de enquête de Tate y Sittiwong. Pendent le période plus récent les dossiers concernant
les droits civiles et libertés sont beaucoup plus nombreux. Nous concluons que possiblement,
quelques variables de l’enquête du Tate et Sittiwong soient liées par le temp et nous proposent
un modèle neuf des votes attitudinal.

may play a role in shaping judicial decisions. The view that the political
preferences of the justices have a strong impact on their decisions is now
the dominant view of decision making on the United States Supreme Court
~Schubert, 1965; Segal and Spaeth, 1993!. A series of studies applying
Schubert’s methods has found similar results in a number of other countries. For instance, scalogram analyses of the supreme courts of India,
the Philippines and Japan found systematic ordering of the justices that
indicated attitudinal patterns in decision making ~Becker, 1970; Flango,
1970; Gadbois, 1969!. And even in the face of a strong tradition of parliamentary supremacy and non-political courts, Robertson found evidence of attitudinal voting in the judicial decisions of the British House
of Lords ~Robertson, 1998!. These studies from multiple areas of the world
suggest that attitudinal voting by the courts often goes hand in hand with
judicial policy making.
Evidence of Ideological Judicial Behaviour in Canada
While it is thus plausible to suspect that judicial decision making in Canada is also driven at least in part by the political attitudes of the justices,
there are few studies of the Supreme Court of Canada that directly test
such a supposition, and those that do exist are not in full agreement as to
whether or not political attitudes, especially those originating in the partisan selection system, affect judicial decision-making. Early studies focusing mainly on judicial decision making on the Supreme Court of Canada
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in the 1950s and 1960s found evidence of substantial attitudinal voting
~ Fouts, 1969; Peck, 1969!. In a 1990s study, McCormick found voting
blocs to exist on the court of Chief Justice Lamer but did not attempt to
link voting blocs to ideological factors ~1998!. Several analyses of Charter decisions in the 1980s and 1990s have reinforced the view that there
is substantial ideological diversity among the judges, but the prevailing
view is that the attitudinal differences among judges are not linked to
ideological selection criteria, party politics, or judge gender ~Heard, 1991;
McCormick and Greene, 1990; Ostberg and Wetstein, 1998!.
Several studies explicitly deny any connection between ideology and
judicial appointment. Morton, Russell, and Withey argue emphatically
that the Supreme Court is not divided between two ideological camps;
instead, they see the majority of judges as political centrists ~1992!. Moreover, they maintain that there is little evidence that the government relies
on ideological criteria to guide their appointment of judges. Further, the
judges themselves deny a connection between their appointments and
political criteria. A leading recent study based on interviews with Supreme
Court judges found that justices do not believe that politics largely plays
a role in the appointment process ~Greene et al., 1998!.
However, because appointing officials can assess the philosophy of
prior appellate judges through their writings, Bzdera suggests that since
appointments in Canada, Germany and the US high courts usually follows service on a lower appellate court, this allows appointing officials
to make appointments more in tune with their own ideological leanings
~1993!. Thus, while it is not certain that the appointment process leads
inevitably either to partisan political appointments or to ideologically motivated appointments, it is certainly possible for that to occur given the
nature of the appointment process.
A paradox thus exists in the prior literature. Tate and Sittiwong suggest that partisan-based ideological differences were evident in the voting behaviour of judges in the period 1949–1985 ~1989!. Since that time,
the Canadian Supreme Court is believed by nearly all observers to have
begun to play a substantially larger role in the policy-making process.
But in spite of its increased role in policy making, a number of observers believe that the role of the policy preferences of potential judicial
appointees plays a much smaller role than such preferences appear to
play in the selection of state and federal appellate judges in the United
States.

The Judge Attribute Model
A problem that has continually plagued attempts to determine whether
judicial attitudes influence their voting decisions is the difficulty in obtain-
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ing both valid and reliable measures of the political preferences and attitudes of the judges. Most of the time, it is impossible to directly measure
the attitudes of judges. For example, most scholars assume that judges
will be unwilling to discuss, openly and honestly, their private political
views in an interview. In addition, while a number of judges have written on questions of legal interpretation in law reviews and other contexts, few have published articles that advocate overtly political points of
views so the writings of judges infrequently provide good measures of
the political attitudes of judges. Faced with this problem of measurement, most of the studies cited above have inferred the attitudes of the
judges from the strong consistency in the patterns of judicial votes and
found that they are consistent with the patterns that one would expect
from ideological voting. But there are often no direct measures of judicial attitudes independent of judicial votes that can be used to verify the
inferences. Thus, the evidence that attitudes influence judicial votes is
often circular.
One attempt to avoid this circularity problem that is inherent in most
scaling analyses has been the development of personal attribute models.
The judge attribute model uses the judge’s personal attributes or social
background characteristics as rough measures or indicators of the judge’s
ideology on particular issues ~Tate, 1981; Tate and Handberg, 1991; Ulmer,
1973!. The judge brings an ideology to the bench that is the result of his
or her “birth, upbringing, socialization, career and partisan affiliation”
~Tate and Handberg, 1991: 461!. In turn, that ideology may determine
how the judge votes in the case ~Peck, 1969; Robertson, 1998; Schubert,
1965; Segal and Spaeth, 1993!, subject to judicial restraints that may exist.
The central insight is that “pre-court life experiences play a prominent
role in shaping the personal values and policy preferences of judges, and
that such biographical factors can be useful in predicting judicial decisions” ~Brudney et al., 1999: 1682!. Use of judicial attributes as measures of, or surrogates for, judicial attitudes has the advantage that the
attributes exist independently of judicial votes, thus avoiding the problem of circularity. Attributes have the further advantage that their existence is clearly prior in time to judicial votes. This time sequence increases
the reasonableness of inferring that if attitudes ~as measured by attributes!
are found to be correlated with judicial votes, the attitudes may be inferred
to have a causal effect on the votes. Finally, judicial attributes have the
useful characteristics that they frequently are readily available and can
be observed and recorded with relatively low cost and that most can be
measured in a highly reliable manner because their values can be determined in a fairly straightforward and “objective” manner. Unfortunately,
it is conceded by even the most fervent advocates of personal attribute
theory that such indicators often provide only rough measures of judicial
attitudes. Nevertheless, judicial attribute theory has been successfully used
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to demonstrate the existence of attitudinal voting on a number of courts
including the Philippines Supreme Court, United States Supreme Court
and its courts of appeals ~Goldman, 1975; Tate, 1972, 1981!.
The use of judicial attributes as measures of judicial attitudes raises
a problem that plagues much social science research. Many concepts that
social scientists are interested in ~for example, attitudes, power, prejudices, fear! cannot be measured directly. In such cases, scholars are forced
to look for indirect measures or indicators of the key concepts that can
be observed and measured in straightforward and relatively objective ways,
but, like judicial attributes, many of these indicators provide only rough
approximations of the core concepts. The roughness of the measurement
presents several problems. First, and probably most frequently, the use of
such rough measures introduces substantial amounts of random error into
the subsequent analyses. Such random error makes it difficult to achieve
standard levels of statistical significance even when a relationship may
in fact exist among the variables in the model. However, the flip side of
this problem is important to note. If one is able to discover statistically
significant relationships among variables in spite of substantial amounts
of random error in the measurement of the variables, one may have
increased confidence that there is actually a relationship among key concepts ~that is, using variables with substantial random error stacks the
deck against confirming theoretically derived hypotheses!. Thus, one may
generally have confidence that the discovery of positive relationships
between measures of attitudes and outcomes reflects a “real” relationship between the attitudinal concept and the observed behaviour. However, one must be cautious about a conclusion that attitudes are not related
to behaviour when there is no statistically significant relationship between
one’s rough measure of attitude and the behaviour. A second potential
threat to the validity of a study using such variables is that one may discover spurious relationships. But the danger that empirically discovered
correlations are spurious is a danger faced by studies employing precisely measured variables as well as studies employing very rough
measures.
The success of several past studies employing judicial attribute theory
has gone a considerable distance towards generating confidence that the
results are not spurious. For example, a series of studies ~Brudney et al.,
1999; Tate and Handberg, 1991; Tate and Sittiwong, 1989! have produced models whose theoretically grounded, single-tailed hypotheses have
explained impressive amounts of the variance in judicial outcomes. It
should be noted that in each of these three studies, the authors are able
to describe the mechanisms that are thought to produce the observed relationships between the specific attributes and behaviour in specific issue
areas. Moreover, in these models, judicial attributes have predicted outcomes successfully in a number of different courts, including the supreme
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courts of Canada and the United States and the courts of appeals in the
US. While the possibility inevitably remains that some of the relationships are spurious, there have been no published studies that have provided plausible alternatives to the interpretations of the authors that these
relationships between attributes and outcomes suggest the influence of
judicial attitudes on their votes. Finally, in each of these three models
~that is, Brudney et al., 1999; Tate and Handberg, 1991; Tate and Sittiwong, 1989! the authors found that a set of multiple indicators of attitudes provide a better prediction of judicial votes than that provided by a
single attribute.
Some scholars ~for example, Ulmer, 1986! have criticized some earlier judicial attribute models ~including Tate, 1981! for being “time bound.”
While some attribute models are undoubtedly time bound, this is a problem that is inherent in virtually all social science research. Social scientists typically investigate a world that is constantly changing. Therefore,
generalizations using any methodology or approach to measurement that
provide completely satisfactory explanations of behaviour for any given
time or place may prove to be inadequate in different temporal or geographic contexts. As Tate and Handberg put it, “theorists should expect
social attribute models to be time bound ... because they reflect politically relevant social structures and society-wide processes of social and
political change” ~1991: 461!. This problem is exacerbated by the possibility that political actors may change their behaviour in response to scholarly studies and thus produce future behaviour that is deliberately contrary
to accepted social scientific findings. Studies that discover that past studies are time bound do not demonstrate that the past studies were invalid
but instead help the scholarly community to produce a revised theory
that may explain how and why relationships vary across time, national
and cultural boundaries and changing institutional contexts.
In their study of the Supreme Court of Canada, Tate and Sittiwong
apply the judge attribute theory ~1989!. They suggest that several factors, including regionalism, religion, partisanship and career experience
will together influence how judges reach decisions. Focusing on all nonunanimous cases during the period from 1949 to 1985, they find that
these judge traits do, in fact, impact judicial decisions. Focusing on two
policy areas, civil rights and liberties and economic cases, they found
that Quebec0non-Quebec regional origins, religious affiliation, political
party, and being appointed by Prime Minister King to have been significant influences on behaviour, as well as whether the judge had prior
judicial and political experience ~1989!. Specifically, they found that the
political culture of Quebec causes justices from that region to vote more
conservatively ~1989: 911!. Religion was divided into two categories:
Catholic and non-Catholic, with Catholic judges expected to be more liberal than their counterparts ~1989: 911!. These measures of regional cul-
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ture and religion were combined into a “non-Quebec0Catholic index” that
was found to be strongly related to liberal judicial voting patterns. They
also found that justices appointed by a Liberal party prime minister and
those with political experience in elective or party politics prior to appointment were linked to liberal decision making ~1989: 907!. Additionally,
judges with more judicial experience prior to appointment were more
liberal than those with little or none ~1989: 906!. Justices appointed by
King were more conservative than justices appointed by other prime ministers ~1989: 911!.
While these findings seem convincing for the time period, as noted
above, judicial attribute theory carries an inherent risk that any specific
findings may be time bound ~Ulmer, 1986!. Studies of judicial attributes
often involve three potential limitations that may make the results time
bound. First, there is often a “small n” problem. Most studies of national
top courts typically involve a small number of justices and an even smaller
number of justices possessing a given attribute. Consequently, the addition of even one or two new justices who share that attribute but who
display different behavioural tendencies may substantially affect the significance level of a given variable.
A second potential limitation of judicial attribute studies is that the
social or political significance of a given attribute may change over time.
Finally, the agenda of a given court may change dramatically over time.
If the nature of the issues before the court changes, then the way in which
attitudes ~as reflected in personal attributes! are translated into votes may
also change. Consequently, the relationship between a given judge’s
attribute, or any other measure of attitudes, and judicial votes will also
change.
These three potential limitations of judicial attribute models are
potentially relevant to the findings of the Tate and Sittiwong analysis of
the Supreme Court of Canada ~1989!. That study was based on the votes
of only 25 justices in the civil liberties area and 22 justices voting on
economic cases; thus there is a potential small n problem. Moreover, some
of the categories of the key independent variables have very few judges
in them. For example, only six judges had any political experience prior
to appointment to the Court and five of those were members of the Liberal party. Similarly, only two members of the Conservative party had
more than three years of judicial experience, and there was only one judge
in the first category of the non-Quebec0Catholic index. While the extent
to which the social or political significance of the attributes used by Tate
and Sittiwong has changed over time is unclear, there have been some
dramatic changes in the agenda of the Court. As noted above, for a large
majority of the period studied by Tate and Sittiwong, the Canadian
Supreme Court lacked docket control and as a result had many fewer
public law questions on its agenda than is characteristic of post-1975
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courts ~Dyck, 2000!. Moreover, the adoption of the Charter of Rights
and Freedoms just three years before the end of the period studied by
Tate and Sittiwong dramatically increased the number of civil liberties
cases on the Court docket. In the analysis below, we utilize an extended
time period to investigate the extent to which the original findings of
Tate and Sittiwong ~1989! may have become time bound and to explore
whether a different set of judicial attributes may now be more useful predictors of judicial behaviour.

Data and Methods
The analysis proceeds in three stages. First, we replicate the Tate and
Sittiwong analysis, extending the time period used in that analysis. The
original time frame, from 1949 to 1985, is extended through the year
2000. By extending the time period, we are able to examine whether or
not the change in the Court’s agenda brought about by the passage of the
Charter of Rights and Freedoms in 1982 and gaining greater control over
its own agenda in 1975 changes the prior findings. Second, we conduct
a separate analysis of the 1978 to 2000 period using the original Tate
and Sittiwong model to analyze the behaviour of judges serving since
the two important structural changes noted above. Finally, we modify the
original model Tate and Sittiwong used to create a judicial attribute model
that more accurately predicts judicial behaviour for the 1978–2000 period.
To extend the analysis of the effects of judicial attributes on voting
in the Canadian Supreme Court, we coded all the nonunanimous decisions of the Canadian Supreme Court from 1978 through 2000.1 In the
first set of analyses described below, these data were combined with the
data used by Tate and Sittiwong in their analysis of voting on the Canadian Supreme Court for the years 1949 –1985 ~1989!.2 Data on the
attributes of judges not included in the original Tate and Sittiwong data
were coded from the Canadian Who’s Who, biographies on the official
web page of the Supreme Court of Canada, and from The Supreme Court
of Canada and Its Justices, 1875–2000 ~2000!. Data on some of the personal attributes of current members of the Court were obtained through
interviews conducted by the senior author with members of the Supreme
Court during the summer of 2002.
Each nonunanimous decision was classified according to the major
substantive issue decided by the Court. Like Tate and Sittiwong ~1989!,
we restricted our analysis to cases raising either civil rights and liberties
or economic issues. More specifically, like Tate and Sittiwong, we included
all case categories included in the “C Scale” and “E Scale” of Schubert’s
landmark analysis of voting on the United States Supreme Court ~1965!.
This categorization includes criminal procedure and rights issues, civil
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rights ~including those relating to minority and gender discrimination!,
the standard set of civil liberties claims ~including those relating to freedom of expression, religion, privacy, education, etc!, labour-management
relations, government regulation of the economy and private economic
disputes in which a clear economic underdog can be identified. Following the coding of Schubert, as well as Tate and Sittiwong, we classified a
vote as liberal if it supported the party asserting the denial of a civil
right or liberty, the defendant in a criminal case, the government in an
economic regulation case, unions or workers in a labour case or the economic underdog in a private economic dispute.
The dependent variable in each table is the career liberalism score
of each judge in the indicated policy area. This score is simply the percentage of decisions supporting the liberal position cast by the judge in
nonunanimous decisions in the period studied for the indicated policy
area. Since the classic analysis of Pritchett ~1948!, scholars have frequently used the presence of dissent on appellate courts as an “objective” indicator that judges were relatively free to vote their preferences
without external constraint from legal or political forces ~see Goldman,
1975!. That is, the presence of dissent is an objective, easily accessible
indicator that legitimate decisional alternatives were open to the judges.
Such a measure is almost certainly under-inclusive; a very high percentage of the nonunanimous cases can be expected to be among those in
which judges were relatively free to vote their policy preferences, but it
will not capture all cases in which judges had legitimate decisional alternatives ~see Atkins and Greene, 1976!. Unfortunately, no one has yet proposed a reliable way to identify which of the unanimous decisions present
judges with a choice situation in which they are relatively free to vote
their preferences. However, since a major objective of the present study
is to determine which judicial attributes are most closely related to the
voting of judges when they do have a legitimate chance to vote their
preferences, it is more important that we identify a non-trivial number of
cases in which one can reasonably assume such an absence of restraint
than we identify the universe of such cases.
Several sets of scores were computed for each judge. First, we classified the cases into the two policy areas used by Tate and Sittiwong ~1989!
and combined our data for 1986–2000 with the votes of judges collected
by Tate and Sittiwong to construct career liberalism scores for the 1949–
2000 period. Next we constructed career scores for our judges using our
data for all nonunanimous decisions from 1978–2000, using the same
two issue areas and the same definitions of liberal and conservative votes.
For the third phase of the analysis, we constructed career scores for
our judges using our data for all nonunanimous decisions from 1978–
2000 for three separate issue areas. We suspected that the agenda of the
court for the 1978–2000 period would be substantially different from the
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agenda of the court for the period studied by Tate and Sittiwong because
of two major structural changes that have occurred. First, in 1975, the
Supreme Court’s discretionary control over its docket was dramatically
increased. Thus, it may be anticipated that the proportion of cases raising significant policy issues has substantially increased since 1975. In
addition, since the adoption of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms in
1982, the number of cases raising civil liberties issues has increased
dramatically, and it is reasonable to assume that the nature of the issues
has also changed substantially since 1982. As a result, there is reason to
suspect that even using the same coding rules, the nature of the cases
comprising the two issue areas examined by Tate and Sittiwong may
have changed dramatically since the period comprising the bulk of their
study. Consequently, career scores ~especially the civil liberties scores!
based on votes before and after 1985 may not be comparable. A quick
check of our career scores lends credence to these concerns. Specifically, when the correlation coefficient between the pre- and post-1985
civil liberties scores of judges serving in both periods is examined, there
is no statistically significant relationship. The same is true for economic scores from the two periods, although the relationship is positive
~r ⫽ .32!.
To further investigate the effect of the changing agenda, we divided
the Tate and Sittiwong civil rights cases into two categories: criminal cases
and all other civil liberties cases. The criminal case scores of judges in
the later period were strongly related to the overall civil liberties scores
of judges in the pre-1985 period ~r ⫽ .91!, while the correlation between
the civil liberties scores ~minus criminal! in the later period and Tate and
Sittiwong’s civil liberties scores was strongly negative ~r ⫽ ⫺.51!. Moreover, for the recent period, the criminal rights career scores of judges
were not related to their civil liberties scores ~r ⫽ .06!.3 Given these disparities, for our analyses of the 1978–2000 period, we created separate
career scores for criminal cases and for the remaining civil liberties cases.
We continued to use the original category of economic cases.
Since the dependent variable in each model, career scores for the
judges in a given policy area, is a continuous variable, we estimated the
effects of each judicial attribute on the career scores, as did Tate and
Sittiwong, with weighted least squares regression ~weighting by the number of votes that comprised each career score!.
We began our analysis of the bases of voting cleavages on the Canadian Supreme Court by coding all of the judicial attributes employed by
Tate and Sittiwong ~1989!. Specifically, we coded the party of the prime
minister who appointed each justice ~Liberal party ⫽ 2, Conservative
party ⫽ 1!, the home province of the justice ~Quebec ⫽ 2, other ⫽ 1!, the
religion of the justice ~Catholic ⫽ 2, other ⫽ 1!, the number of years of
judicial experience before appointment to the Supreme Court, and whether
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or not the justice had significant political experience in elective or party
office before appointment to the Supreme Court ~those with experience ⫽ 2, others ⫽ 1!. In their analysis, Tate and Sittiwong combine the
region and religion of each justice into a non-Quebec0Catholic index taking the value “1” for Quebec Protestants, “2” for Quebec Catholics, “3”
for non-Quebec Protestants, and “4” for non-Quebec Catholics. We replicated this coding for our justices.

Extending the Tate-Sittiwong Attribute Model
The original analysis presented by Tate and Sittiwong ~1989: 911! found
that all five attributes were related to the judicial career scores of the
justices to a statistically significant extent in both civil liberties and economic cases. In both issue areas, judges scoring high on the non-Quebec0
Catholic index had more liberal records than justices scoring low on the
index. In addition, justices appointed by a Liberal party prime minister
and those having substantial political and judicial experience had more
liberal records than those from different backgrounds. Finally, when the
effects of party were controlled, justices appointed by Prime Minister
King were more conservative.
Our preliminary re-analysis of the Tate and Sittiwong data indicated
that dropping the variable denoting appointment by King did not significantly reduce the explanatory power of the model and did not substantially affect the relative impact of the other variables in the model.
Therefore, because of the highly skewed distribution of this variable in
the extended time period, we dropped it from our first model. The results
of our modified replication of the Tate and Sittiwong model for the
extended period, 1949–2000, are presented in Table 1.
There is a dramatic difference between the results in Table 1 and the
Tate and Sittiwong model. While the Tate and Sittiwong model was quite
robust for the period they studied, for the extended period neither model
explains even a quarter of the variance and neither the civil liberties nor
the economic model is statistically significant overall. The effects of the
individual variables are also quite different. In the civil liberties model,
only the non-Quebec0Catholic index reaches a level of statistical significance and even its effect is substantially reduced from its impact in the
1949–1985 period. Neither political party nor political experience nor
judicial experience appears to be related to judicial liberalism. The results
for the economic case model are more similar across time periods, though
the overall effects for the extended time period are greatly reduced. Judicial experience and the non-Quebec0Catholic index remain related to judicial economic liberalism to a statistically significant, though quite modest,
degree for the entire 1949–2000 period. Party is marginally significant
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TABLE 1
Personal Attribute Model
Canadian Supreme Court Justice Liberalism 1949–2000
Civil Rights and Liberties

Economics

Independent variable

b

SE

Independent variable

b

SE

Party
Non-Quebec0Catholic
Political experience
Judicial experience
~Intercept!

0.064
0.063*
0.032
0.004
0.209

0.0063
0.034
0.079
0.006
0.159

Party
Quebec-Protestant
Political experience
Judicial experience
~Intercept!

0.067#
0.050*
⫺0.036
0.007*
⫺0.007

0.044
0.025
0.054
0.004
0.157

R 2 ⫽ 0.102; Adj RSq ⫽ 0.015
F ⫽ 1.02; p~ F! ⫽ 0.40
Degrees of freedom ⫽ 4
N ⫽ 40

R 2 ⫽ 0.226; Adj RSq ⫽ 0.195
F ⫽ 2.63; p~ F! ⫽ 0.05
Degrees of freedom ⫽ 4
N ⫽ 40

*Significant at the .05 level
**Significant at the .01 level
# Significant at the .10 level

and political experience does not show the predicted relationship to judicial liberalism at all.
Thus, the Tate and Sittiwong model ~1989: 906! appears to be substantially time bound. Overall, the model does a relatively poor job of
predicting judicial behaviour for the entire 1949–2000 period and there
is only modest consistency between the effects of the individual variables when the original and extended time periods are compared.
Judge Attributes and Judicial Liberalism at the End
of the Twentieth Century
The next phase of our analysis is to examine the voting behaviour of the
justices of the Supreme Court of Canada in the data we collected for
the period 1978–2000. Our analyses are based on the career scores of
the justices in three separate policy areas: criminal appeals, civil rights
and liberties excluding criminal procedure, and economic cases. As noted
above, judicial decisions in the criminal and civil liberties areas appear
to reflect different attitudinal dimensions since there is essentially no correlation between the positions of the justices in the two areas.
The first step was to examine in each of these areas the effect of the
attributes used by Tate and Sittiwong in their earlier analysis. The models in Table 2 thus have the same four independent variables: party of the
prime minister, the non-Quebec0Catholic index, prior political experience and the length of prior judicial experience.
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TABLE 2
Personal Attribute Model
Canadian Supreme Court Justice Liberalism 1978–2000
Civil Rights and Liberties

Economic

Criminal

b

SE

Independent Variable

b

SE

Independent variable

b

SE

⫺0.027
0.021
⫺0.065
⫺0.001
0.458

0.076
0.034
0.101
0.007
0.159

Party
Non-Quebec Catholic
Political
Judicial
~Intercept!

0.057
0.005
⫺0.001
0.007#
0.450

0.046
0.024
0.070
0.004
0.103

Party
Non-Quebec Catholic
Political
Judicial
~Intercept!

0.081
0.008
0.051
⫺0.008
0.442

0.097
0.046
0.135
0.009
0.211

R 2 ⫽ 0.099; Adj RSq ⫽ ⫺0.080
F ⫽ 0.55; p~ F! ⫽ 0.69
Degrees of freedom ⫽ 4
N ⫽ 24

SUSAN W. JOHNSON

*Significant at the .05 level
**Significant at the .01 level
#Significant at the .10 level

R 2 ⫽ 0.189; Adj RSq ⫽ 0.027
F ⫽ 1.17; p~ F! ⫽ 0.35
Degrees of freedom ⫽ 4
N ⫽ 24

AND

R 2 ⫽ 0.033; Adj RSq ⫽ ⫺0.160
F ⫽ 0.17; p~ F! ⫽ 0.94
Degrees of freedom ⫽ 4
N ⫽ 24

DONALD R. SONGER

Independent variable
Party
Non-Quebec Catholic
Political
Judicial
~Intercept!
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The findings stand in dramatic opposition to the findings of Tate and
Sittiwong ~1989!. The models for both civil liberties ~minus criminal cases!
and criminal cases are particularly striking. Neither model explains even
10 per cent of the overall variance, and neither model is statistically significant overall. Turning to the coefficients for the individual variables,
one can see from Table 2 that none is close to statistical significance and
four of the eight coefficients actually have signs in the opposite direction
from the signs of the comparable variables in the original Tate and Sittiwong model. Only the model for economic decisions even approximates
either of the original Tate and Sittiwong models. For economic decisions
from 1978–2000, the model explains 19 per cent of the variance and the
effect of prior judicial experience is close to conventional standards of statistical significance. The coefficients for political party of the appointing
prime minister and the non-Quebec0Catholic index are positively signed
as predicted, but are not statistically significant. These findings are in
marked contrast to the strong relationships between judicial liberalism and
all four independent variables in the earlier period.
Overall then, the Tate and Sittiwong judicial attributes appear to provide a very poor explanation of judicial voting in any of the three issue
areas examined for the 1978–2000 period. Therefore, we conclude that
the lack of significant relationships for the 1978–2000 period between
judicial career scores with party, religion, regional origins, judicial experience and political experience is due to the time bound nature of the
Tate and Sittiwong model. Given the failure of this earlier model to remain
robust over time, we attempted to create a modified model that would
provide a better explanation of judicial voting at the end of the twentieth
century.
A Revised Attribute Model of Voting on the Canadian
Supreme Court
One of the most obvious changes on the Supreme Court of Canada is
that in recent years women have begun to win appointment. Only one
female was on the Court during the Tate and Sittiwong time period. By
the end of the year 2000, three of the nine justices were female and since
1978, a total of four women have served. While the evidence is mixed,
there is at least some evidence that women on other appellate courts vote
differently than their brethren on some issues. For example, females judges
on the United States Courts of Appeals more frequently take liberal positions than their male colleagues in civil rights cases ~Songer, Davis, and
Haire, 1994; but see Walker and Barrow, 1985, for somewhat contradictory results! and in some areas of civil liberties women judges on
American state supreme courts have been found to provide greater support for liberal outcomes ~Allen and Wall, 1993; Songer and Crews-
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Meyer, 2000!. Thus, we hypothesize that there may be gender differences
in judicial voting on the Canadian court, at least in civil liberties cases.
To test for these potential effects, we added a variable for judge gender
~female ⫽ 1, male ⫽ 0! to our model.
We also speculate that given the increasing importance of language
and cultural issues among the mix of civil rights issues, and the generally
high salience of issues related to Quebec separatism, there may be an interaction between party and region in Canada ~Dion, 1992!. The fact that
Quebec separatism has endured as a major cleavage in Canada ~Irvine and
Gold, 1980! also leads us to speculate that regional effects on judicial
behaviour will persist in the later time period. This is especially significant given that the Canadian party system differs from the US party system in that partisan affiliation takes on different meanings in various
provincial settings ~Gaines, 1999; Johnston et al., 1992!. Further, the passage of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms and its subsequent interpretative meaning has been perceived differently in Quebec than in other
regions of the country ~Taylor, 1993!. In fact, Quebec is the only province who failed to sign the Charter after the failure of the Meech Lake
Accord, which may have furthered Quebec separatism to an even greater
extent ~Russell, 1991!. This speculation takes on added significance when
it is noted that partisan representation on the court has a regional dimension. In particular, nearly half of the Liberal party justices who have served
since 1980 have been from Quebec. In contrast, only three of the 12 Conservative party justices since 1980 have their origins in Quebec. Thus, the
failure to find any partisan effects in the analysis in Table 2 may be due,
at least in part, to a political culture or a political selection system in Quebec that results in an interaction of party identification with the communal and conservative values of their province’s political and social system.
Thus, Quebec conservatives or liberals may not completely identify with
the mainstream values of their party in the rest of Canada. To test this idea,
we added to our model of judicial voting a multiplicative term between
party of the appointing prime minister and Quebec origins.
In addition, the attempt by Tate and Sittiwong to capture regional
effects solely through the use of a dummy variable to reflect Quebec versus non-Quebec origins may miss some of the complexities of Canadian
regionalism. By law, three of the nine members of the Canadian Supreme
Court must be from Quebec and by tradition, three of the remaining justices come from Ontario, the province with the greatest population, and
the one most frequently associated with a pro-national government orientation. Our modified model thus contains three regional dummies, one
for Quebec, one for Ontario origins and one for the provinces west of
Ontario, with the default category being judges from the east.
While we have no reason to quarrel with the reasons originally
advanced by Tate and Sittiwong on the importance of religion in Cana-
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dian politics, the results displayed in Table 2 indicate that their index
combining religion with Quebec versus non-Quebec origins is no longer
viable. Thus, to capture any potential effects of religion, we add a dummy
variable for religion taking the value “one” if the justice is a Catholic
and the value “zero” for all other justices.
The modified model thus contains seven variables: party of the
appointing prime minister, Quebec origins, the multiplicative term for
the interaction between party and Quebec origins, Ontario origins, western origins, gender and religion.4 The results of the analysis are displayed in Table 3.
The most obvious observation from the findings in Table 3 is that
the revised models in all three issue areas substantially outperform the
models in Table 2. All three explain more than half of the variance and
all are statistically significant.
Turning first to civil liberties decisions, we note that the model performs least well in this area. While overall, 54 per cent of the variance
in judicial liberalism is explained, most of the variables have rather
modest effects. Neither political party nor its interaction with regional
origins is statistically significant ~for the interaction, p ⫽.12!. However,
regionalism appears to be relatively important. Ontario justices are more
liberal and Quebec judges are more conservative than their colleagues
from the east. The difference between Ontario and Quebec and justices
is significant at the .05 level. Next we note that the impact of gender
appears to parallel the findings from American appellate courts. Female
judges have significantly more liberal records than their male colleagues on civil liberties cases and the differences are statistically
significant
The expansion of the representation of regional cleavages was also
important for the explanation of judicial voting in criminal cases. Judges
from both Ontario and the west had significantly more liberal records
than judges from the east, while Quebec judges were substantially more
conservative than judges from any of the other three regions. Perhaps the
most interesting results from Table 3 are the findings that there is a significant interaction effect between party and Quebec origins. For criminal cases Quebec Liberals have more liberal voting records than their
same party colleagues from other provinces. For the justices appointed
by Conservative party prime ministers, Quebec justices have more conservative records than their party colleagues from other provinces. Thus,
both party and region appear to be crucial to understanding the voting of
justices in criminal cases. For religion, the results support the original
predictions of Tate and Sittiwong that Catholic judges will be more liberal than their Protestant peers ~1989!.
For economic cases, the results overall are also quite strong, with over
62 per cent of the variance explained. Regional differences and political
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TABLE 3
Alternative Model
Canadian Supreme Court Justice Liberalism 1978–2000
Civil Rights and Liberties
SE
0.078
0.123
0.098
0.132
0.113
0.093
0.066
0.363

R 2 ⫽ 0.637; Adj R Sq ⫽ 0.447
F ⫽ 4.01; p~ F! ⫽ 0.01
Degrees of freedom ⫽ 7
N ⫽ 23

b

SE

0.157**
⫺0.331**
0.160*
0.003
⫺0.027
⫺0.023
0.021
0.493

0.047
0.077
0.070
0.072
0.061
0.055
0.048
0.121

Independent variable
Party
Quebec Liberal
Quebec
Ontario
West
Catholic
Gender
~Intercept!

R 2 ⫽ 0.621; Adj RSq ⫽ 0.379
F ⫽ 3.76; p~ F! ⫽ 0.01
Degrees of freedom ⫽ 7
N ⫽ 23

SUSAN W. JOHNSON

*Significant at the .05 level
**Significant at the .01 level
#Significant at the .10 level

SE
0.091
0.144
0.127
0.143
0.121
0.098
0.085
0.244

AND

R 2 ⫽ 0.539; Adj RSq ⫽ 0.337
F ⫽ 2.67; p~ F! ⫽ 0.04
Degrees of freedom ⫽ 7
N ⫽ 23

b
⫺0.031
0.350*
⫺0.214#
0.466**
0.293*
0.256*
⫺0.075
⫺0.008

Independent Variable
Party
Quebec Liberal
Quebec
Ontario
West
Catholic
Gender
~Intercept!

Economic

DONALD R. SONGER

b
⫺0.070
0.152
⫺0.063
0.214#
0.044
⫺0.056
0.130*
0.335

Independent variable
Party
Quebec Liberal
Quebec
Ontario
West
Catholic
Gender
~Intercept!

Criminal
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party are again important predictors of voting, but the interaction between
the two in economic cases is substantially different from what was found
in criminal cases. Outside of Quebec, Liberal party justices are substantially more liberal than their Conservative party colleagues. But within
Quebec, Liberal party justices are less likely to support liberal economic
outcomes than their Conservative party counterparts. This reversal of the
“normal” party differences within Quebec appears to be due largely to differences within the Conservative party: Conservatives within Quebec are
significantly more liberal than their same party colleagues in other provinces on economic issues.
For economic cases, neither religion nor gender appears to be important. The magnitude of the effects of both variables is small and statistically insignificant.
Perhaps the most interesting revelation of the combined results from
Table 3 is the findings that there is a significant interaction effect between
party and Quebec origins in all three issue areas. Surprisingly, however,
the nature of the interaction varies across issue areas. For both civil liberties and criminal cases Quebec Liberals have more liberal voting records
than their same party colleagues from other provinces. For the justices
appointed by Conservative party prime ministers, Quebec justices have
more conservative records than their party colleagues from other provinces. However, for economic cases, the relationships are reversed. Quebec Liberal party appointees are more conservative than their Conservative
party colleagues from the same region, due in large part to the liberalism
of Quebec Conservative party judges compared to Conservative party
judges from other regions.
Thus, both region and party continue to be associated with judicial
voting in the Canadian Supreme Court. The preliminary findings in Table 2,
which suggested no regional or party effects, were misleading because they
failed to account for important interaction effects between region and party.
That is, party has a different relationship to judicial recruitment in Quebec at least since the 1980s than it does in the rest of the country.
The other interesting comparison across the three issue areas involves
the effect of judge gender. The results parallel those discovered in appellate courts below the level of the Supreme Court in the United States. In
both Canada and the United States, female judges appear to be more likely
to support liberal outcomes in civil liberties cases, but do not support
measurably different outcomes in other issue areas.
Conclusions
The most important implication of our findings is that personal attribute
models of judicial voting on the Canadian Supreme court appear to be
time bound. Attributes that provided a robust prediction of judicial out-
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comes in the 1950s, 1960s and 1970s have lost most of their predictive
power in the past quarter century. This is not to suggest that we have
discovered a “better” model of judicial behaviour than that employed by
Tate and Sittiwong. Our model displayed in Table 3 does not perform
well for the entire 1949–2000 period.5 Instead, it appears that since the
mid- to late 1970s, the changing agenda of the Court has produced a
modification in the relevance of several attributes that previously appear
to have been useful indicators of relevant judicial attitudes. While the
precise mechanisms by which a changing issue agenda interacts with the
effects of judicial attributes cannot be determined from the data available for this study, we speculate that the mix of prior judicial versus political experience ~which Tate and Sittiwong found to be quite important!
may be more relevant for an agenda that does not have as many politically charged issues as those faced by the current court. Moreover, there
is no way of knowing whether gender may have been relevant for judicial voting during much of the period studied by Tate and Sittiwong for
the simple reason that there were no female justices during much of that
time.
There is an important corollary to the finding that the judicial
attribute model employed by Tate and Sittiwong is time bound. It is possible to construct a judicial attribute model in each time period that
explains a large proportion of the voting behaviour of the justices in nonunanimous decisions. As Brudney and his associates point out, “analyses
like ours identify composite trends; they do not pigeonhole particular
judges” ~1999: 1760!. To the extent to which these personal attributes
are at least rough indicators of judicial values, it provides evidence that
is consistent with the conclusion that for at least an important minority
subset of all the decisions of the Supreme Court, the political preferences of the justices matter. The analysis above examined only the divided
decisions of the Supreme Court, and these have been a minority of all
the Court’s decisions in every year during the past half-century, but this
dataset still appears to include many of the most politically divisive issues
tackled by the Court. And on these important issues, who appointed the
justices and what their political preferences are may determine the outcome of the decision.
In the United States, regionalism is on the wane and ideological differences increasingly correspond to partisan differences. Voting by US
Supreme Court justices and by the judges on other appellate courts is
largely related to partisan ideology. Liberal and conservative judges in
the United States fall into camps that divide to a large degree along party
lines. However, in Canada, it appears that partisanship alone is not as
good a predictor of judge voting. Regionalism appears to play a much
greater role in the degree to which judges are liberal in their decisions.
Judges from Quebec are more conservative in personal rights areas, while
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more liberal than others in economic areas. Justices from Ontario appear
to be more liberal in civil rights and liberties areas than other judges.
Moreover, partisan differences cannot be fully explained without examining the interaction between party and region. These differences are not
surprising given the distinct ethnic subculture of Quebec from the rest of
Canada. Before the 1960s, Quebec, largely French-speaking, was quite
conservative in attitudes and values and heavily influenced by Catholicism. Even since the Quiet Revolution that brought cultural change in
Quebec, Quebeckers have remained a distinct subculture from the rest of
Canada ~Dyck, 2000!.
At the same time, gender also seems to predict some judicial behaviour fairly well in the Canadian context. Female judges are more liberal
in civil rights areas and possibly more conservative in criminal rights
areas than their male colleagues. The impact of gender on the Court should
not be surprising given the speeches of a few of the female justices.
Madame Justice Bertha Wilson stated that she believed there was merit
to the point that there were differences in the way males and females
think ~Bushnell, 1992!. Comments by Madame Justice Claire L’HeureuxDube indicate that she thought that the Court ought to have an enhanced
role where the law is reflective of changing society through the use of
creative jurisprudence ~Bushnell, 1992!. It is clear that these female justices bring a unique element to the Court that may not have existed prior
to their appointments.
While some studies previously have denied an attitudinal element to
exist in voting by Canadian Supreme Court justices, it appears that this
is not the case. At least in the nonunanimous decisions examined in the
present analysis, the justices’ votes appear to reflect ideological leanings. However, in contrast to the US, it appears that factors other than
partisanship are important in trying to approximate judicial attitudes. The
regional and gender traits appear to have a greater role in shaping liberal
attitudes than partisanship alone. Whether the political preferences of
potential nominees or their attitudinally relevant attributes are of direct
concern to those involved in judicial selection cannot be determined without further study. However, the finding that judicial attributes and, by
implication attitudes, are related to judicial outcomes suggests the need
for future studies that examine more closely the factors relied upon by
appointing prime ministers and their advisors when making a judicial
selection.

Notes
1

We initially coded the universe of decisions published in the Canadian Supreme Court
Reports which provides the opinions of all decisions of the court. From this universe
we selected all cases decided with one or more dissents. This data collection is part
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of a larger project funded by two grants by the National Science Foundation, “Collaborative Research: Fitting More Pieces into the Puzzle of Judicial Behaviour: A
Multi-Country Database and Program of Research,” C. Neal Tate, Donald R. Songer,
Stacia Haynie and Reginald S. Sheehan, principal investigators, SES-9975323; and
“Collaborative Research: Extending a Multi-Country Database and Program of
Research,” C. Neal Tate, Donald R. Songer, Stacia Haynie and Reginald S. Sheehan,
principal investigators, SES-0137349.
The authors wish to thank Professor Tate for sharing his data from his earlier study
and for describing the coding conventions he used. In the combined analysis for the
period 1949–2000 we added our data from 1986 through 2000 to the Tate data covering the years 1949 through 1985.
We tried subdividing the economic scores, breaking out just the cases involving government regulation of the economy or those cases plus labour cases. However, both
of these subcomponents were strongly correlated to the overall economic scores that
contained private economic scores.
In results not displayed, we re-ran this model with the addition of variables for political experience, and judicial experience. Neither of these two additional variables
reached conventional levels of statistical significance in any of the three issue areas.
We also re-ran the models in Table 3 with two alternative ways to operationalize
judicial experience. First, we substituted the log of the years of prior judicial experience to determine if added years of experience had diminishing effects. Next, we
created a dichotomous variable taking the value “1” for judges with any prior judicial experience and “0” for those with no experience. Neither of these alternative
measures produced significant results.
We re-ran our model for the entire 1949–2000 period, results not displayed, and
discovered that the explanatory power of the model decreased substantially compared to the results displayed in Table 3.
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